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Professor Fallers, an anthropologist, who went to East Africa to study
the politics and administration of Soga society, found the preoccupation of the Basoga with litigation and the arts of adjudication sufficient
to attract his own skilled mind to a study of the Basoga courts and
law. As he states in his preface, he found their excellent court records
irresistible so he proceeded to collect as much material as he could
without really knowing what he would do with it. For many years since
collection of this material he has been trying to determine why he
found it so fascinating. The present book results from his conclusion
that a theory of law occupies an especially strategic place in sociocultural studies because one must take seriously both ideas and social
relations.
The Basoga are a rural people inhabiting a portion of present-day
Uganda where Lake Victoria spills into the Nile. To the traditional
society of a rich subsistence culture based on the banana have been
added valuable cash crops: cotton, peanuts, and coffee. Nevertheless,
the society remains a rural society with no urbanism in sight.
British colonial legislation and practice, as is well known, left wide
areas of law to be supplied by "native law and custom" which according
to the Native Courts Ordinance of 1941 was to govern both the substance and procedure of adjudication. Unlike Llewellyn and Hoebel's
attempt to discover and describe a pure indigenous "Cheyenne" law,
before influenced by colonists, Fallers regards Soga law as in continuous
development, and his interest is in how it develops and not with an
attempt to assess foreign sources for the development nor to discover
what it was before the British influence became paramount in the
1890's.
The thesis of Fallers' analysis is that Basoga judges, without written
precedents as the Anglo-American legal tradition understands them,
engage in "legal reasoning." He finds the view of law of H.L.A. Hart
(The Concept of Law) and of legal reasoning of Edward Levi to be
particularly congenial for his analytic purposes. Legal reasoning is "the
application to the settlement of disputes of categorizing concepts that
define justiciable normative issues" which must be decided by a
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process of "inclusion or exclusion." Hart states that law involves the
combination of "primary rules of obligation" with "secondary rules"
which are rules about the primary rules. The secondary rules specify
the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained,
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the facts of their violation conclusively determined. The legal mode of social control requires that
values with respect to human conduct be reduced to normative statements which are sufficiently discrete that it may be authoritatively determined whether or not in a particular case a particular rule has been
violated.
Fallers takes two spheres of Soga life represented in the cases for the
years 1950-52 which he collected: the field of sexual relations and marriage and the field of rights in land. An important basis of the selection
of these two fields is the "difficulty" which the court system appears to
have with them, measured both by their frequency and by the number
of appeals. In each classification of cases Fallers proceeds from the "run
of the mill" in the sense that the judges experience little difficulty in
finding the facts and in fitting them into an appropriate category where
the normative rule is relatively stable to a final set of situations where
a cultural or social change is obviously taking place. The illustration of
change in the marriage field is a child marriage case in which a woman
given in marriage by her father is allowed to be divorced on the basis
of her assertion without a "ground" for divorce that she no longer
loved her elderly husband. In the land field the final conflict considered
was the development of a "contractual tenancy" arising neither from
allocation by a headman or official administrative allocator nor from
inheritance, but from a "loan" of land for a particular purpose by a
person who had in the historical past been a beneficiary of the two
recognized methods of allocation.
The common theme of these materials for Professor Fallers is that
here he has a legal system of social control which has concepts and
categories which change but which exist without overt communication,
that is, without precedent or legislation. The legal systems with which
Hart and Levi were concerned make use of devices for communicating
rules or conceptual applications both among courts and between courts
and litigants, but the system with which Fallers is concerned has not
developed a system of communicating, a requirement for law according
to Hart. While the young Basoga acquire a command of the system
in the process of growing up, by attending court and listening to their
elders' out-of-court legal conversation, neither of these processes of
education makes the conceptual structure of the law very explicit. It
took Fallers' analysis of the cases to uncover the subsidiary concepts by
inference from the arguments, questions, and decisions of those who
participate in the trial process.
In a sense the Year Book reports were in the form of the report of
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Basoga cases but for the comments of Coke and other reporters. Fallers
has performed the work which the analyzer-reporters of the Year Book
cases did for Anglo-American law. A puzzling question is: What was
it that induced the Year Book reporters to add to the reports their
comments which often made explicit the subsidiary concepts? Why
was this regarded as important? Fallers suggests that without this
categorizing tendency of the precedent reporting system in AngloAmerican law "it would be impossible to maintain order within a
rapidly changing legal system." It is only when the society and the
law are relatively static can uncommunicated categories and concepts
continue to exist. While change can occur in this system, it probably
can exist only if the change is more gradual than it has been in most
of Anglo-American legal history. Fallers does not hazard a guess as to
the future.
Fallers also attempts to put Busoga legal culture into perspective by
comparing them with the Barotse, Tiv and Arusha as shown in the
works of Gluckman, Bohannan, and Gulliver. All four cultures indicate a "litigious" nature. The Arusha in adjudication attempt to
assess the whole situation using moral and political arguments. The
Soga, on the other hand, attempt in the process of litigation from the
decision to make a "case" (complaint) in court through the interrogation and arguments to determine whether a set of facts falls within
the reach of one particular concept. While much is listened to, most
is excluded and the interrogation set forth in the Fallers text indicates
how interrogation by the judges is more designed to eliminate matters
than to develop the whole circumstances. Between these two extremes
Fallers places the Barotse and Tiv. Consensus or agreement is important for the Arusha and Tiv but the concept of wrong is developed
by the judges without an attempt to produce consent in the Soga and
Barotse cultures.
What lessons can one learn from this excellent study of a single
legal system about law and social reform in both developing nations
and in highly developed nations? After his cases were collected but
before he completed his analysis, Professor Fallers and the reviewer
were members of a "team" of experts to make recommendations about
reform of the land law of the Basuto in southern Africa. We faced a
problem which by "hindsight" I can see Professor Fallers knew how
to deal with from his experience with the Basoga. We concluded in
our recommendation that reform of process should precede substantive
reform. Like the the Basoga, the Basuto had a well developed concept
of allocation by a village headman and chief; unlike the Basoga, the
political and administrative functions of chieftanship had not been
as dearly separated from the land allocating function. Unlike the
Basoga, the Basuto had not developed a very complete idea of inheritance. Like the Basoga, the Basuto had developed an "under-
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ground" or "extra-legal" system of "loaning" land. We concluded
that development of citizen's advisors to the allocating chief was the
best way of regularizing and developing a set of concepts about land
tenure and that we should not try to state a more or less finished system of relationships concerning land but should expect a system to
develop in accordance with expectations. The "gamble" was a belief
that developing ideas and concepts would result from a system in which
the allocator was accountable. It remains to be seen whether in the
last half of the 20th century any citizenry has "time" to rely on
evolving concepts as the method of change. Professor Fallers shows
that if a tendency to categorize has already developed and if confidence
in the system of adjudicators is maintained, change can occur and
occur quite rapidly whether there is a public system of precedents
or not.
Western jurisprudence tends to see in the work of anthropologists
concerning less industrialized societies rewarding points of comparison
and even insights as to the meaning of our own concepts. Perhaps we
need to reanalyze our own system as if we had no commentators, and
systemizers of the past; as if we too were a rich legal system without
precedent. Professor Fallers shows us how it can be done.

